



Constitutional reforms in Morocco
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ARAB SPRING
Abstract:
l he paper concerns the process of constitution-making and relates to some constitutional 
changes adopted in Morocco in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The author focuses on 
the content of the new constitution of 29 July, 2011 and takes into consideration the most 
important provisions connected with the system of government, lhe author emphasizes 
the strengthening of the position of the government headed by the prime minister and pay s 
attention to the parliamentary components of the new basic law. 1 lowever, the conclusion is 
that the constitutional reforms of 201 1 do not go too far and bas e their clearly visible limits.
Key words: Morocco, the Arab Spring, the constitution of 2011, the svstem of government, 
the executive branch
1. Introductory remarks
The Arab Spring in Morocco was strongly related to the activity of 20 February 
Movement - various groups expecting far-reaching political changes. One of the 
key demands of protesters was to carry out constitutional reforms, which would be 
much deeper than the changes introduced in previous vears. To a large degree, the 
desired reforms were intended to transform the Moroccan svstem of government
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established in the constitution of 19961. The followers of 20 February Movement 
demanded a significant limitation of the constitutional position of the monarch, 
which would lead to a parliamentary system of government known from most Eu­
ropean states. According to the theoretical construction of such a model, the posi­
tion of the head of state is reduced to a representative and ceremonial functions. 
The president or monarch has very little impact on the daily management of the 
state and the process of determining of the state policy. What is more, the head of 
state is devoid of a strong legitimacy obtained directly from the people. The presi­
dent or monarch may, however, play the role of arbitrator, who only occasionally 
interferes with the activity of the other organs of the state, such as the parliament 
or the government. As a result, the burden of the state policy rests with the prime 
minister, who is the head of government and the most important person on the 
political scene. In short, in such a system the head of state is politically neutralized. 
Therefore, the government is responsible exclusively before the parliament. The 
head of state has no right to dismiss the government without a previous demand 
of the prime minister2.
I lowcver, tile demands of protesters also included social reforms, as well as tile fight against 
corruption and nepotism. Constitutional changes were therefore not the only ones that 
were expected to be introduced. See: E Abdel mourn n i, “l.c Maroc ct lc I’rintcmps arabc”, 
Pouvoirs Vol. 2, 2013, no. 145, pp. 131-134; B. Duprct, J.-N. Ferric, “Maroc: le ‘I’rintcmps 
arabc’ de la monarchic”, Moyen-Orient 2011, no. 12, pp. 57-58. It is estimated that on 
20 February 2011 150-200 thousands of the Moroccan people in over fifty cities and towns 
took part in the protests against the existing political and social situation. Sec: M. Madan i, 
D. Maghraoui, S. Zerhouni, “'Hie 2011 Moroccan Constitution. A critical analysis”, 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm 2012, p. 6, 
[on-line] http:/7www.idea.int/publications/the_201 l_moroccan_constitution, 12 July 2015. 
More broadly on the theoretical construction of the parliamentary system of government 
sec: C. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incen­
tives and Outcomes, New York 1997, pp. 101-119.
Its example is the semi-presidential system of government that has existed in France 
since the coming into force of the constitution of 1958. More broadly on this topic sec: 
B. Clift, “Dvarchic presidentialization in a presidentialized polity, llic French fifth Repu­
blic”, [in:] 1 he Presidentialization of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, 
It should be noted, however, that contemporary European parliamentary sys­
tems are applicable in a far rationalized version. In this case, the political and 
constitutional position of the parliament is significantly reduced, which in turn 
contributes to the strengthening of the position of the executive branch of govern­
ment. Consequently, the process of rationalization of the parliamentary system of 
government can go in two different directions. In the first case, the strengthening 
of executive power relates primarily to the head of state. In extreme form, it leads 
to the introduction of the semi-presidentialism, which should be regarded as the 
result of profound rationalization of the parliamentary model. This version of ra­
tionalization exists in some European republics’. In the second case, through the 
aforementioned process, the prime minister (together with the government) be­
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comes the kev element in the structure of the executive branch, while at the same 
time the position of the head of state is obviously weakened. The same refers to the 
status of the parliament in relation to the government. This version of rationaliza­
tion is typical for modern European monarchies. It may be described as a premier­
ship system of government4. What is important, common element of both variants 
of rationalization is a limited position of the legislative power. It is exemplified by 
a significant role of the executive branch in the law-making process.
I'll, l’oguntkc, R Webb (cd.), Oxford-New York 2(105, pp. 221-245, [on-line] http://dx. 
doi.org./10.1093/0199252017.001.0001.
Its example is the premiership system of government that exists in the United Kingdom. 
More broadly on this topic see: R. Heffernan, I’ Webb, “The British Prime Minister: 
Much More Ilian ‘hirst Among Equals’”, [in:] The Presidentialization..., Th. l’oguntkc, 
P Webb (cd.), pp. 26-62, [on-line] http://dx.doi.org./l0.1093/0199252017.001.0001 ; J. Szy­
manek, “System rządów premicrowskich jako nowy typ systemu rządów: casus W ielkiej 
Brytanii”, Przegk/d Politologiczny 2011, no. 1, pp. 65-77.
I1’. Biagi, “The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits", jean Mon­
net Occasional Paper 2014, no. 7, p. 5, [on-line] https://www.uin.cdu.mt/_ data/assets/pdf
_filc/0016/207610/J M_Occasional_Papcr_no._7_final_vcrsion_after_2nd_amendmcnt.pdf, 
10 July 2015.
K. Naciri, “La loi et le règlement dans la Constitution”, [in:] ¡'rente années de vie constitu­
tionnelle au Maroc, [in:] I). Bas ri, M. Rou sse t, C. Vedcl (éd. ), Paris 1993, p. 294.
The structure of the system of government established in the Moroccan con­
stitution of 1996 indicated that it contained some elements of the parliamentary 
model. A confirmation of this was the principle of political responsibility of the 
government before the parliament - a necessary condition for such a system. The 
principle was, however, adopted in a limited form and had no significance in the 
political practice. Consequently, the existence of some components of parliamen- 
tarianism does not change the fact that before 2011 the Moroccan constitutional 
system was far from mechanisms that are typical for European monarchical model. 
Evidence of this is the content of all previous Moroccan constitutions of 1962, 
1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996. All the basic laws were adopted during the reign of 
Hassan II who remained in power until 1999. These constitutions gave the king 
a lot of important competences and confirmed his dominance across the entire 
political system. In addition to the constitutional provisions that were favorable to 
the monarch, authoritarian stvle of governance should also be taken into account’. 
All this meant that the pro-democratic constitutional changes, which were started 
to be made in the 1990s, had little political significance. One of such reforms was 
the establishment of the Constitutional Council - the body whose main task is to 
control the constitutionality of the law6. Despite accession to the throne by Mo­
hammed VI, which took place in the late 1990s, a new constitution was not enacted 
then. A sudden acceleration of the constitutional process occurred only as a result 
of the Arab Spring. The turmoil connected with the events of 2011 contributed to 
the adoption - after 15 years - a completely new constitution. The act introduced 
some novelties concerning the fundamental constitutional principles, as well as 
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major organs of the state, including the monarch, the government, the prime min­
ister and the chambers of bicameral parliament.
2. The enactment of the 2011 constitution as a result 
of the Arab Spring
The process of constitutional reforms was launched bv Mohammed VI. A fast deci­
sion concerning the creation of the new constitution allowed him to retain a big im­
pact on its final shape. On 9 March 2011 Mohammed VI indicated the most impor­
tant components which the new basic law would include. The monarch mentioned, 
inter alia, the promotion of fundamental rights and a guarantee of the independ­
ence of the judicial branch of government. Mohammed VI also paid attention to the 
changes that would affect the system of government. Among his demands there was 
the reinforcement of the principle of the separation of powers, as well as the transfer 
of new' powers to the legislative body. What is more, the monarch also recognized the 
need to improve the status of opposition political parties. From the point of view of 
the system of government, the most significant element of the planned reform was, 
however, the requirement that the king would appoint as the prime minister a mem­
ber of the political party with the largest number of votes in parliamentary elections'. 
It w'ould undoubtedly expose the principle of political responsibility of the govern­
ment before the parliament. Consequently, the expected constitutional changes, in 
particular those relating to the structure of the system of government, would result 
in the weakening of the role of the king, and at the same time in the increasing of the 
position of the parliament and the government headed by the prime minister. The 
extent, to which the strong constitutional position of the monarch would be limited, 
was therefore essential in the draft constitutional reform.
Following his speech of 9 March, Mohammed VI established the Consultative 
Commission on Constitutional Reform. The forum consisted of not only lawyers 
but also economists and sociologists. All the members of this body were appointed 
by the monarch. Its task was to draft a text of the reformed basic laws. It is worth 
emphasizing that - unlike some other states that experienced the Arab Spring, 
for example Tunisia - in Morocco there w'as no constituent assembly composed 
of popularly elected representatives of various political parties and other organi­
zations. However, during the work on a new constitution different organizations 
could submit their proposals on constitutional issues. This also applied to 20 Feb- 
F. Biagi, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
Ibid., p. 7; O. Bcndourou, “La nouvelle Constitution marocaine du 29 juillet 2011”, Revue 
Irançaise de Droit Constitutionnel 2012, no. 91, p. 512, [on-line] http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ 
rfdc.091.0511 ; l·,. Popławska, “Recepcja zasad zachodniego konstytucjonalizmu (na 
przykładzie Maroka)”, [in:] Zmiany polityczne w państwach arabskich. Wybrane zagadnienia 
ustrojowe, A. Rothcrt, J. Szymanek, A. Zięba (cci.), Warszawa 2012, pp. 37-38.
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ruarv Movement'1. It does not change the fact that the new constitution has been 
prepared under the auspices of the monarch. It was the king who took the idea of 
the constitutional changes so that he acquired a special position as an initiator 
of the reforms, proving that he is able to respond immediately to the voice of the 
people. Imposing the main directions and the scope of the constitutional reforms, 
the monarch was able to control indirectly the process of constitution-making. The 
attention should be paid, however, to the significant difference in comparison with 
the previous constitutions, even with those which were adopted in the 90s. They 
all were imposed directly by Hassan II111. In this case, as a result of the Arab Spring, 
the power of the king to shape the content of the constitution was to some extent 
limited. Due to the quick response of the monarch and the immediate establish­
ment of the Consultative Commission on Constitutional Reform, the organiza­
tions representing the 20 February Movement did not have a decisive influence on 
the final content of the new basic law. After a few months, July 1, 2011, the draft 
constitution was submitted to a popular referendum. Almost 73% of eligible voters 
took part in the vote. The new constitution was supported by over 98% of them. 
The process of constitution-making ended 29 July, 2011 with the promulgation of 
the new basic law".
'' F Biagi, op. cit., pp. 7-9.
111 l'île monarch had therebv a specific pre-constitutional power (pouvoir 'pre-constiluant'}. 
See: Μ. Roussel, “I anterprétation des pouvoirs du roi dans kl nouvelle Constitution”, [in:] 
Lu Constitution marocaine de 2011. Analyses et commentaires, Centre dT'.tudcs Internatio­
nales (cd.), Paris 2012, pp. 50-52.
11 O. Bendourou, op. cit., p. 513; I1'. Popławska, op. cit., p. 38.
12 Daliir n° 1-11-91 du 27 chaabane 1432 (29 juillet 2011) portant promulgation du texte de 
la Constitution, bulletin Officiel, 30 July 2011, no. 5964 bis, pp. 1902-1928, [on-line] http:// 
www.sgg.gov.ma, 10 Julv 201 5; Draft Text of the Constitution Adopted at the Referendum of 
1 fuly 2011, trans, bv J.J. Rucliti, [in:] World Constitutions Illustrated, J.J. Rucliti (cd.), 
Buffalo-New York 2011, [on-line] http://wsnv.coiistitutionnet.org/filcs/morocco_cng.pdf, 
10 Julv 201 5.
" Daliir n° 1-96-157 du 23 joumada 1 1417 (7 octobre 1996) portant promulgation du texte de 
la Constitution révisée, Bulletin Officiel, 10 October 1996, no. 4420 bis, pp. 643-654, [on- 
-linc] http://www.sgg.gov.ma, 10 July 2015.
3. The constitutional system of government
Taking into consideration the constitutional position of the most important organs 
of the state, it should be noted that the Moroccan constitution of 29 July, 2011* 112 *
reinforces the principle of the separation of powers. According to the article 1, Mo­
rocco is a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary and social monarchy. The con­
stitutional system of the Kingdom is based on the separation, the balance and the 
collaboration of powers. Such wording was lacking in the previous constitution of 
7 October, 19961’. It is worth noting that the close cooperation of divided powers 
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is a key element of the parliamentary system of government. In the constitution of 
2011 the factor is emphasized much stronger than before. There is no doubt that 
without respecting the principle of separation of powers, the parliamentary system 
cannot be properly constructed and appropriately implemented. This concerns in 
particular the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches of 
government.
In regard to the functions conferred on the monarch, it is clear that the con­
stitution of 2011 changes the relationship between the monarchy and the govern­
ment. In the article 42 the king is defined as the head of state, its supreme repre­
sentative and a symbol of the unity of the Nation. The role of the monarch is also 
to be the guarantor of the continuity of the state, as well as the supreme arbitrator 
(Arbitre suprême) between the institutions, who guards the respect for the basic law 
and the regular functioning of the constitutional institutions. The monarch has to 
protect the democratic choice (choix démocratique) and the rights and freedoms of 
the citizens. Moreover, the king is the guarantor of the independence of the state 
and of its territorial integrity. It is worth noting that the function of an arbitrator 
that alleviates conflicts between other organs of the state is typical of the role of the 
head of state in the parliamentary model. Moreover, in the new constitution the 
functions of the king as the head of state have been separated from his functions 
as a religious leader. This is an important change in comparison with provisions of 
the previous constitutions. In this way, the two main roles of the head of state are 
clearly separated. It contributes to a better implementation of the rules of the par­
liamentary system in which the position of the monarch as a religious leader should 
not impinge on its functions within the system of government.
As indicated in the speech of Mohammed VI on March 9, 2011, under the new 
basic law, the king who appoints the government after the parliamentary elections 
is obliged to take into account the political composition of the House of Repre­
sentatives (Chambre des Représentants) - the first chamber of the Moroccan parlia­
ment. According to the article 47, the king appoints the prime minister (described 
in the constitution of 2011 as the head of government - Chef du Gouvernement) 
from the political party that wins the parliamentary elections, and with a view to 
their outcomes14. On proposal of the head of government, the monarch appoints 
the other members of the cabinet. It should be pointed out that previously the 
prime minister was appointed at the discretion of the king. What is more, in the 
light of the constitution of 2011 the prime minister and the government are pri­
marily responsible to the parliament. The prime minister needs to be supported by 
the parliament at the stage of the creation of the new government after parliamen­
tary elections. As provided in article 88, after the designation of the members of the 
14 According to Mohammed Amine Benabdallah, this constitutional provision implies that 
it is the prime minister, not the monarch, who decides on the composition of his own 
government. Sec: M.A. Benabdallah, “l,c bicaméralisme dans la Constitution marocaine 
de 2011”, [in:] La Constitution marocaine.... Centre d’l'.tudes Internationales (cd.), p. 129.
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government by the head of state, the prime minister presents before both cham­
bers the programme that is going to be implemented. There is a debate before 
each of the chambers, but the discussion is followed by a vote only in the House of 
Representatives. The confidence is expressed by the vote of the absolute majority 
of all its members. In this way, the responsibility of the government before the par­
liament - the most important component of the parliamentary system - was clearly 
marked. In turn, the political responsibility of the government before the monarch 
is not expressed in a direct way. Moreover, the new constitution provides in the 
article 89 that the government exercises the executive power. This constitutional 
provision should be seen in the context of the principle of the separation of pow­
ers that has been undoubtedly strengthened in the new basic law. As stated in the 
said article, under the authority of the prime minister, the government puts into 
effect its own governmental programme. On this basis it can be concluded that the 
government plays an important role in determining the state policy.
A stronger position of the prime minister is also visible in other areas. In the 
article 104 of the new constitution, the head of government has been granted the 
right to dissolve the parliament. It refers exclusively to the House of Representa­
tives, so the prime minister is not allowed to dissolve the second chamber - the 
House of Councillors (Chambre des Conseillers). The dissolution of the first cham­
ber may take place by a decree passed in the Council of Ministers. Moreover, it re­
quires consultations with the monarch, the president of the first chamber and the 
president of the Constitutional Court’1. It should be pointed out that the right of 
the prime minister to dissolve the parliament is quite original. It is due to the fact 
that in the pure parliamentary system of government the dissolution of parliament 
is a typical competence of the head of state that acts as a political arbitrator. It is 
used mainly in order to ensure the necessary balance between the government and 
the legislative body16. Even though in the light of the constitution of 2011 the Mo­
roccan parliament may be dissolved bv the monarch, it is not the exclusive compe­
tence of the head of state. In this respect, the role of the prime minister is, however, 
more limited. Firstly, the head of government may dissolve only the first chamber, 
whereas the king is entitled to dissolve both of them. Secondly, the application 
of the article 104 requires the participation of the Council of Ministers, which is 
headed by the king. Therefore, the monarch is surely not devoid of influence on the 
decision of the prime minister who seeks to dissolve the House of Representatives.
H following the adoption of the constitution of 2011, the latter body has replaced the Consti­
tutional Council. Its role has also been strengthened. It corresponds to the idea of consoli­
dating the status of the judiciary in the Moroccan political system. More broadly on the ju­
dicial branch of government in the constitution of 2011 sec: B. Mathieu, “Ećnicrgcncc du 
pouvoir judiciaire dans la Constitution marocaine de 201 1”, Pouvoirs Vol. 2, 2013, no. 145, 
pp. 47-58; Y. Gaudemet, “Le pouvoir judiciare dans la Constitution marocaine de 2011”, 
[in:] Lu Constitution marocaine.... Centre d’Ltudes Internationales (ed.), pp. 199-205.
1,1 f.. Jakubiak, “l’arlamentaryzacja marokańskiego systemu rz;)dów na gruncie konstytucji
z dnia 29 lipca 2011 r.”, Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego 2014, no. 4, pp. 108-109.
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What is more, the constitution of 2011 strengthened the role of the prime 
minister as the leader of the government. According to the article 92, under the 
presidency of the prime minister, the Council of Government - body, which was 
not provided in the previous constitutions - deliberates on the general policy of the 
state before it is presented in the Council of Ministers. It also deliberates on some 
other issues, such as: public policies, the engagement of the political responsibil­
ity of the government before the first chamber, as well as current affairs relating to 
the human rights and public order. This is another proof of a better position of the 
government and the prime minister. It should be emphasized that meetings of the 
Council of Government - unlike meetings of the Council of Ministers - are held 
without the participation of the king. Consequently, the prime minister may meet 
officially with ministers without the participation of the monarch, which gives the 
opportunity to determinate the policy of the government within its own political 
environment. For this reason, the Council of Government in Morocco resembles to 
some extent the council of cabinet in the Fifth French Republic, although the lat­
ter has not been settled in the constitutional provisions. It appeared only in politi­
cal practice. It is worth noting that the Moroccan Council of Government has its 
own constitutional powers, which means that this body is not under the constant 
tutelage of the king1'.
The consequence of the strengthening of the position of the government led 
by prime minister is the evident shift in emphasis concerning the political respon­
sibility of the government. The constitution of 2011 does not contain provisions 
explicitly giving the monarch a right to dismiss the whole government by his own 
decision. The article 47 provides only that the king may, on his own initiative, and 
after consultation with the prime minister, terminate the functions of one or seve­
ral members of the body. This means that - according to Didier Maus - political 
responsibility before the king is ambiguous and not as strong as beforels. What is 
more, the right to dismiss ministers has not been exempted from the requirement 
of countersignature. It further reduces the position of the monarch in relation to 
the government. It should be mentioned that the king does not have a direct im­
pact on the composition of the government. It is due to the fact that the head of 
state appoints the members of the bodv on proposal of the prime minister. On the 
basis of the constitutional regulation of the governmental responsibility, it seems 
that the cabinet led by the prime minister is much more connected with the par­
liament than with the monarch11'. It is one of the most important features of the 
constitutional reform of 2011. The same process can be seen in the constitutional 
regulation of the motion of censure. According to the article 105, the House of
17 D. Melloni, “La Constitution marocaine de 2(111. line mutation des ordres politique ct 
juridique marocains”, Pouvoirs Vol. 2, 2013, no. 145, p. 7.
Is D. Maus, ‘T,exécutif dans la Constitution marocaine de 2011 ”, [in:] Lcr Constitution maro­
caine..., Centre d’Etudcs Internationales (cd ), p. 75.
19 L. Jakubiak, op. cit., pp. 107-108.
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Representatives mav engage the political responsibility of the government on its 
own initiative. Moreover, the parliamentary responsibility of the body before the 
first chamber may be engaged by the head of government. It takes place on a dec­
laration concerning the public policy or in connection with the vote of a text. The 
refusal of confidence has far-reaching effects. It results in the resignation of govern­
ment (the article 103). It is worth noting that in the light of the new constitution, 
the parliament has additional instruments that give it the opportunity to obtain 
information about governmental activities. According to the article 101, the prime 
minister presents before the parliament an account concerning the actions taken 
bv the government. The head of government is obliged to do so if there is a de­
mand of the members of the legislative body, but the prime minister has also the 
possibility to act on his own initiative.
The reinforcement of the constitutional position of the prime minister and the 
government is unquestionable, but this opinion should not lead to far-reaching 
conclusions. Despite the aforementioned changes, a lot of key royal powers have 
been retained. As a result, the king can still have a major impact on the activity 
of the government. First of all, according to the article 48, the king presides over 
the Council of Ministers composed of the prime minister and other ministers. As 
provided in the article 49, the Council of Ministers deliberates on the strategic 
directions for the state policy. This body also deliberates on other matters, such 
as: amendments to the constitution or bills of organic laws. In this way, the king is 
able to influence directly the policy of the state. Through the Council of Ministers 
the monarch could also try to secure a permanent guardianship of the government. 
The monarch promulgates laws (the article 50), may address messages to the Na­
tion and to the parliament (the article 52) or is able to dissolve both chambers of 
the parliament or only one of them (the article 52). These powers give him direct 
influence on the parliament, and indirect on the government. What is more, the 
king still plavs an important role in the field of national security. It results from 
his function as the supreme chief of the royal armed forces. The special attention 
should be paid to the Superior Council of Security (Conseil supérieur de sécurité), 
because it is the monarch who presides over this body. Moreover, the head of state 
has extraordinary powers if there is a serious threat to the state security. According 
to the article 59, when the integrity of the national territory is threatened or the 
regular functioning of the constitutional institutions of the state is obstructed, the 
king may, after consultations with the prime minister, the president of the House 
of Representatives, the president of the House of Councillors, as well as with the 
president of the Constitutional Court proclaim the state of emergency2". The
111 Such royal powers are based directly on the article 16 of the trench constitution of 1958. 
these powers were also granted to the king in the previous Moroccan constitutions. Such 
a regulation of the state of emergency is characteristic of other trcnch-spcaking African 
countries. More broadly on this topic see: J. Robert, “I’.ctat d’exception dans la Constitu­
tion du Maroc ”, [in:) Trente années..., pp. 2 39-26(1; A. Cabanis, ML. Martin, I,es consti­
tutions d'Afric/ue francophone. Evolutions récentes, Paris 1999, pp. 105-109. 
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extraordinary powers of the monarch undoubtedly correspond to his role as the 
guarantor of the national independence.
It should also be noted that not all the powers of the head of state require the 
countersignature. As far as the powers that have been exempt from countersigning 
are concerned, the monarch is able to make use of a substantial scope of political 
autonomy. The limited significance of countersignature causes that the head of 
state is much more independent from the government. In conjunction with some 
other provisions of the current basic law that are surely beneficial to the monarch, 
it must be said that the planned weakening of its constitutional position has its 
clearly defined limits. This in turn determines the extent to which it is possible to 
strengthen the status of the prime minister as the head of government. Taking into 
account the described position of the king, there is no reason to believe that the 
prime minister could become an exclusive leader of the executive branch. There is 
no doubt that the monarch has not been deprived of any significant influence on 
the daily management of the state. Chairing the meetings of the Council of Minis­
ters, where a lot of important decisions are made, proves it. This is the place where 
the king still has a lot to say. The same applies to the remarkable participation of 
the monarch in the law-making process.
4. Conclusions
In conclusion, it should be noted that - as far as the constitutional reforms of 2011 
are concerned - the Arab Spring has brought only limited success. It is very well 
visible on the example of the system of government that is regulated in the provi­
sions of the basic law. Contrary to the expectations of supporters of the 20 February 
Movement, Morocco did not transformed into a monarchy based on the European 
parliamentary model in which “the king reigns but does not govern”21. It can be 
concluded, however, that the current Moroccan system of government seems to be 
much more balanced. Consequently, this system is more like a classic semi-presi­
dential system than pure parliamentary one. Such a situation can be seen as a result 
of the specificity of the Moroccan political life and the tradition of the country in 
conjunction with some circumstances of the Moroccan Arab Spring (first of all, 
a fast response of the monarch after the outbreak of social protests). Therefore, 
the king could impose the framework of the new basic law and control the process 
of constitution-making. However, despite the limited results of the constitutio­
nal changes, the basic law of 2011 clearly differs from the previous constitution of 
1996. From this point of view, the new constitution seems to be an important step 
forward. Thanks to the basic law, Morocco is undoubtedly closer to the European 
monarchical systems, although this goal is still far away. Taking into account the 
specificities of North African states, it does not seem that it will ever be achieved.
I·'. Biagi, i>p. cit., p. B.
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It can also be concluded that after the Arab Spring of 2011 the Moroccan con­
stitutionalism, which since the adoption of the first basic law of 1962 has been 
borrowing some French constitutional designs22, resembles - toutes proportions 
gardées - the semi-presidential system of the Fifth Republic. Although Morocco 
is not a republic, in the light of the constitution of 2011, relations in the triangle 
of the head of state - the government - the parliament seem to be quite similar 
to the relationship between the French political institutions that constitutes the 
semi-presidential model. In both cases, the characteristic is a kind of constitutional 
balance of power within the executive branch of government. Following the adop­
tion of the constitution of 2011, the Moroccan system of government approached 
the parliamentary system in its highly rationalized version. Consequently, the par­
liamentarization of the system of government, which had been dominated by the 
monarch before 2011, resulted in the adoption of ideas, which are typical of semi- 
presidentialism. The most important issue is that in such a system there is - as 
Giovanni Sartori noted - a bicephalous executive that is composed of the head 
of state and the prime minister. The latter is independent from the president of 
the Republic, but has to be supported by the parliament. At the same time, the 
head of state is quite strong, but cannot govern alone. It leads to the conclusion 
that the president of the Republic has to share executive power with the head of 
government2’. However, the aforementioned constitutional similarities do not nec­
essarily mean similarities in the practice of governance. The real functioning of the 
constitutional institutions is the result of many factors, which are to a large degree 
unrelated to the content of the basic law.
Various mechanisms of rationalized parliamentarianism concerning law-making process 
may be regarded as constitutional designs taken from I rance and applied in the Moroccan 
constitutionalism. More broadly on this topic sec: M. Guibal, “Les sources modernes dc 
la Constitution marocaine”, [in:] trente années..., I). Basri, M. Rousset, G. Vcdcl (cd.), 
pp. 50-54.
G. Sartori, op. cit., pp. 131-132. More broadly on the other definitions of semi-presidenti- 
alism sec: M. Duvcrger, “Lc concept de régime scmi-presidentiel ”, [in:] I,es regimes semi- 
presidentiels, M. Duvcrger (cd.), Paris 1986, pp. 7-17; R. Ligie, “W hat is semi-presiden- 
tialism and where is it found?’’, [in:] Semi-presidentialism outside Europe. A comparative 
study, R. LIgie, S. Moestrup (cd.), London-New York 2007, pp. 1-13; J. Szymanek, “Sys­
tem pólprezydencki (mieszany). Metodologiczna zasadność i prakscologicz.ua użyteczność”, 
[in:] Systemy rzgdów w perspektywie porównawczej, idem (cd.), W'arszawa 2014, pp. 279-323.
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